

RESOLUTION MSC.597(111) (adopted on 18 May 2026)
REVISED INTERIM RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CARRIAGE OF
LIQUEFIED HYDROGEN IN BULK

ANNEX 26

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**REVISED INTERIM RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CARRIAGE OF
LIQUEFIED HYDROGEN IN BULK**

THE MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE,

RECALLING Article 28(b) of the Convention on the International Maritime Organization concerning the functions of the Committee,

NOTING that the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea ("the Convention"), 1974 and the International Code for the Construction and Equipment of Ships Carrying Liquefied Gases in Bulk ("the IGC Code") currently do not specifically provide requirements for carriage of liquefied hydrogen in bulk by sea,

NOTING ALSO that paragraph 5 of the Preamble of the IGC Code states that requirements for new products and their conditions of carriage will be circulated as recommendations, on an interim basis, prior to the entry into force of the appropriate amendments,

RECOGNIZING a need for the development of the Revised interim recommendations for carriage of liquefied hydrogen in bulk,

ACKNOWLEDGING that, in the interim, there is an urgent need to provide recommendations to the Administrations on safe carriage of liquefied hydrogen in bulk,

ACKNOWLEDGING ALSO that the Revised Interim Recommendations are intended to facilitate establishment of a tripartite agreement for a pilot ship, which will be developed for the research and demonstration of safe long-distance overseas carriage of liquefied hydrogen in bulk,

HAVING CONSIDERED the Revised Interim Recommendations prepared by the Sub-Committee on Carriage of Cargoes and Containers at its eleventh session,

1 ADOPTS the Revised interim recommendations for carriage of liquefied hydrogen in bulk, the text of which is set out in the annex to the present resolution;

2 INVITES Member States to apply the Revised Interim Recommendations to the pilot ship carrying liquefied hydrogen in bulk, taking the explanatory notes into consideration;

3 AGREES to acquire information on safe carriage of liquefied hydrogen in bulk prior to amendment to the IGC Code for the inclusion of liquefied hydrogen;

4 ALSO AGREES that these Revised Interim Recommendations may need to be reviewed if they are to be applied to ships other than the pilot ship; and

5 URGES Member States and the industry to submit information, observations, comments and recommendations based on the practical experience gained through the application of the Revised Interim Recommendations and submit relevant safety analysis on ships carrying liquefied hydrogen in bulk.

6 REVOKES resolution MSC.565(108).

ANNEX

REVISED INTERIM RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CARRIAGE OF LIQUEFIED HYDROGEN IN BULK

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 For the carriage of liquefied gases in bulk by ships, the ships should comply with the relevant requirements in the IGC Code, as amended ("the Code"). The scope of the Code provided in paragraph 1.1.1 is:

"The Code applies to ships regardless of their size, including those of less than 500 gross tonnage, engaged in the carriage of liquefied gases having a vapour pressure exceeding 0.28 MPa absolute at a temperature of 37.8°C, and other products, as shown in chapter 19, when carried in bulk".

1.2 A ship carrying liquefied hydrogen in bulk (hereinafter called "liquefied hydrogen carrier") should comply with the Code.

1.3 The Code requires that a gas carrier should comply with the minimum requirements for the cargo listed in chapter 19. However, the requirements for liquefied hydrogen are not specified in the Code.

1.4 This annex provides the Revised Interim Recommendations, as referred to in paragraph 5 of the preamble of the Code, for the carriage of liquefied hydrogen in bulk, which are intended to provide the basis for the future minimum requirements for the carriage of this cargo. The Revised Interim Recommendations are intended to facilitate the establishment of a tripartite agreement among the relevant Administrations for the carriage of liquefied hydrogen in bulk. However, they are not intended to prohibit the adoption of designs and arrangements other than those specified in the Code or in these Revised Interim Recommendations, at the discretion of the Administrations.

1.5 These Revised Interim Recommendations have been developed under the assumption that a liquefied hydrogen carrier does not carry liquefied gases other than liquefied hydrogen. These Revised Interim Recommendations, therefore, are not applicable to liquefied hydrogen carriers carrying gases other than liquefied hydrogen.

1.6 In the Code, reference is made to paragraph 5 of the Preamble; paragraph 1.1.6.1; and Note No.8 on completion of certificate in "model form of international certificate of fitness for the carriage of liquefied gases in bulk" in appendix 2 to the Code.

1.7 These Revised Interim Recommendations consist of the following parts. Part A is applicable to ships with any type of cargo containment system. Part B and subsequent part(s) prescribe additional special requirements for cargo containment systems of specific types.

Part A: General (applicable to ships with any type of cargo containment system);

Part B: Cargo containment systems of independent cargo tanks using vacuum insulation;

Part C: Cargo containment systems of independent cargo tanks using insulation materials and hydrogen gas in the inner insulation spaces; and

Part D: Cargo containment systems of a membrane-type cargo tank maintaining the insulation spaces under vacuum.

1.8 Part A of these Revised Interim Recommendations was developed based on the design of parts B, C and D. If subsequent part(s) are added, the special requirements prescribed in part A may be reviewed.

Part A
General
(Applicable to ships with any type of cargo containment system)

2 GENERAL

2.1 Definition

2.1.1 The following definition should apply for the purpose of these Revised Interim Recommendations.

Permeation is the flow of a fluid through another material by diffusion without a defect or opening of the latter.¹

2.2 Requirements for carriage of liquefied hydrogen in bulk

2.2.1 The requirements for the carriage of liquefied hydrogen in bulk have been developed based on the results of a comparison study of similar cargoes listed in chapter 19 of the Code, e.g. liquefied natural gas.

2.2.2 Chapter 19 of the Code governs the application of general requirements for respective cargoes. Selections of the general requirements for respective cargoes are expressed in columns 'c' to 'g'. In addition to general requirements, special requirements may apply to specific cargoes depending on the properties/hazards of the cargoes.

2.2.3 Tables 1 and 2 specify the proposed selection of the general requirements and the special requirements, respectively, for liquefied hydrogen. In addition to table 2, special requirements for cargo containment systems of specific types are prescribed in part B or subsequent part(s).

¹ See paragraph 3.79 of ISO/TR 15916:2015.

Table 1: Requirements for carriage of liquefied hydrogen in bulk

<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>c</i>	<i>d</i>	<i>e</i>	<i>f</i>	<i>g</i>	<i>h</i>	<i>i</i>
Product name		Ship type	Independent tank type C required	Control of vapour space within cargo tanks	Vapour detection	Gauging		Special requirements
Hydrogen		2G	-	-	F	C		See table 2 and, either corresponding table 4 or table 5 or table 6, as appropriate for the type of cargo containment systems

Table 2: Special requirements for carriage of liquefied hydrogen in bulk

No.	Special requirement	Related hazard
A-1	Requirements for materials whose design temperature is lower than -165°C should be agreed with the Administration, paying attention to appropriate standards. Where minimum design temperature is lower than -196°C, property testing for insulation materials should be carried out with the appropriate medium, over a range of temperatures expected in service.	Low temperature (see 4.2.1)
A-2	Materials of construction and ancillary equipment such as insulation should be resistant to the effects of high oxygen concentrations caused by condensation and enrichment at the low temperatures attained in parts of the cargo system (refer to the requirement for nitrogen). This special requirement is applied to all locations where contact with condensed oxygen is anticipated under normal conditions and foreseeable single failure scenarios.	Low temperature (see 4.2.2)
A-3	For cargo pipes containing liquid hydrogen and cold hydrogen vapour, measures should be taken to prevent the exposed surfaces from reaching -183°C. For places where preventive measures against low temperature are not sufficiently effective, such as cargo manifolds, other appropriate measures such as ventilation which avoids the formation of highly enriched oxygen and the installation of trays recovering liquid air may be permitted in lieu of the preventive measures. Insulation on liquid hydrogen piping systems exposing to air should be of non-combustible material and should be designed to have a seal in the outer covering to prevent the condensation of air and subsequent oxygen enrichment within the insulation.	Low temperature (see 4.2.2)
A-4	Appropriate means, e.g. filtering, should be provided in cargo piping systems to remove impure substances condensed at low temperature.	Low temperature (see 4.2.3)

No.	Special requirement	Related hazard
A-5	Pressure relief systems should be suitably designed and constructed to prevent blockage due to formation of water or ice.	Low temperature (see 4.2.4)
A-6	At places where contact with hydrogen is anticipated, suitable materials should be used to prevent any structural deterioration owing to hydrogen embrittlement and degradation of strength and fatigue properties due to continual exposure to hydrogen, as necessary.	Hydrogen embrittlement (see 4.3)
A-7	Double tube structures ensuring no leakage, or fixed hydrogen detectors being capable of detecting a hydrogen leak, should be provided for confined places where leakage of hydrogen may occur, such as cargo valves, flanges and seals.	Susceptibility to leakage (see 4.4.2)
A-8	Helium or a mixture of 5% hydrogen and 95% nitrogen should be used as the tightness test medium for cargo tank and cargo piping.	Susceptibility to leakage (see 4.4.3)
A-9	The amount of carbon dioxide carried for a carbon dioxide fire-extinguishing system should be sufficient to provide a quantity of free gas equal to 75% or more of the gross volume of the cargo compressor and pump rooms in all cases.	Fire by Hydrogen (see 4.7.3) Wide range of flammability limits (see 4.10)
A-10	When deterioration of insulation capability by single damage is possible, appropriate safety measures should be adopted taking into account the deterioration.	High pressure (see 4.8)
A-11	Appropriate measures should be provided to prevent vents becoming blocked by accumulations of ice formed from moisture in the air.	Low temperature (see 4.2.2)
A-12	Due consideration should be given to means for handling boil-off gas.	High pressure (see 4.8)
A-13	Due consideration should be given to static electricity associated with rotating or reciprocating machinery including the installation of conductive machinery belts and precautionary measures incorporated in operating and maintenance procedures, in addition to the bonding of tanks, piping and equipment required by paragraph 5.7.4 of the Code. Anti-static clothing and footwear, and a portable hydrogen detector should be provided for each crew member working in the cargo area.	Static electricity (see 4.9.2)
A-14	The cargo operation manuals required in paragraph 18.2 of the Code should include limitations of various operations in relation to environmental conditions.	Wide range of flammability limits (see 4.10)

No.	Special requirement	Related hazard
A-15	An appropriate procedure should be established for warm-up, inert gas purge, gas-free, hydrogen purge and pre-cooling. The procedure should include: .1 selection of inert gas in relation to temperature limit; .2 measurement of gas concentration; .3 measurement of temperature; .4 rates of supply of gases; .5 conditions for commencement, suspension, resuming and termination of each operation; .6 treatment of return gases; and .7 discharge of gases.	Prevention of dangerous purging operation (see 4.11)
A-16	Only almost pure para-hydrogen (i.e. more than 95%) should be loaded in order to avoid excessive heating by ortho- to para-hydrogen conversion.	General (see 4.1)
A-17	Fire detectors for detecting hydrogen fire should be selected, taking into account the features of hydrogen fire, to the satisfaction of the Administration.	Features of hydrogen fire and fire hazard (see 4.7.4)
A-18	At the design stage, dispersion of hydrogen from vent outlets should be analysed in order to minimize risk of ingress of flammable gas into accommodation spaces, service spaces, machinery spaces and control stations. Extension of hazardous areas should be considered based on the results of the analysis.	Low density and high diffusivity (see 4.5)
A-19	Due consideration should be given to appropriate safety measures to prevent formation of explosive mixture in the case of a leakage and permeation of hydrogen, including: .1 installation of hydrogen detectors in order to detect a possible ground-level travel of low temperature hydrogen gas, and at high points in spaces where warm hydrogen gas can be trapped; and .2 application of "best practice" for land-based liquid hydrogen storage taking into account appropriate guidance such as "Cryogenics Safety Manual – Fourth Edition (1998)"⁽⁸⁾.	General (see 4.1)
A-20	In the case that fusible elements are used as a means of fire detection required by paragraph 18.10.3.2 of the Code, flame detectors suitable for hydrogen flames should be provided in addition at the same locations. Appropriate means should be adopted to prevent the activation of the ESD system owing to false alarms of flame detectors, e.g. avoiding activation of the ESD system by a single sensor (voting method).	Fire hazard (see 4.7.4)

No.	Special requirement	Related hazard
A-21	Consideration should be given to enhance the ventilation capacity of the enclosed spaces subject to liquefied hydrogen leakage and permeation, taking into account the latent heat of vaporization, specific heat and the volume of hydrogen gas in relation to temperature and heat capacity of adjacent spaces.	Low density and high diffusivity (see 4.5)
A-22	Liquid and gas hydrogen pipes should not pass through enclosed spaces in addition to other than those referred to in paragraph 5.2.2.1.2 of the Code, unless: .1.1 the spaces are equipped with gas detection systems which activate the alarm at not more than 20% LFL and shut down the isolation valves, as appropriate, at not more than 40% LFL (see sections 16.4.2 and 16.4.8 of the Code); and .1.2 the spaces are adequately ventilated; or .2 the spaces are maintained in an inert condition.	Susceptibility to leakage (see 4.4)
A-23	A risk assessment should be conducted to ensure that risks arising from liquefied hydrogen cargo affecting persons on board, the environment, the structural strength or the integrity of the ship are addressed. Consideration should be given to the hazards associated with properties of liquefied hydrogen and hydrogen gas, physical layout, operation and maintenance, following any reasonably foreseeable failure. For the risk assessment, appropriate methods, e.g. HAZID, HAZOP, FMEA/FMECA, what-if analysis, etc., should be adopted taking into account IEC/ISO 31010:2019 "Risk management – Risk assessment techniques" ⁷⁾ and SAE ARP 5580-2001 "Recommended failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) practices for non-automobile applications" ⁹⁾ .	General (see 4.1)
A-24	Relief valve sizing should be undertaken for the most onerous scenario. The evaluation should include the fire scenario and should consider the resulting magnitude of the heat flux on the cargo containment system.	High pressure hazard (see 4.8)
A-25	A filling limit exceeding 98% at reference temperature should not be permitted.	High pressure hazard (see 4.8)
A-26	Bolted flange connections of hydrogen piping should be avoided where welded connections are feasible.	Susceptibility to leakage (see 4.4.2)
A-27	Due consideration should be given to the invisible nature of hydrogen fire from the viewpoint of safety of ships and especially personnel in case of fire.	Fire hazard (see 4.7.1)

3 EXPLANATION ON GENERAL REQUIREMENTS

3.1 Properties of liquefied hydrogen

The application of general requirements in the Code for liquefied hydrogen has been considered based on a comparison study on the physical properties of liquefied hydrogen and LNG. LNG and liquefied hydrogen are cryogenic liquids, non-toxic, and generate flammable high pressure gas. For reference, table 3 shows the comparison of physical properties of hydrogen and methane, the major component of LNG.

Table 3: Comparison of physical properties of Hydrogen and Methane

	Hydrogen	Methane	References
Boiling temperature (K)*	20.3	111.6	ISO ¹⁾ , Annex A, Table A.3
Liquid density (kg/m ³)*	70.8	422.5	ISO ¹⁾ , Annex A, Table A.3
Gas density (kg/m ³)** (Air: 1.198)	0.084	0.668	NIST RefProp ¹⁰⁾
Viscosity (g/cm•s x 10 ⁻⁶)			
Gas	8.8	10.91	NIST RefProp ¹⁰⁾
Liquid	13.49	116.79	NIST RefProp ¹⁰⁾
Flame temperature in air (°C)	2396	2230	Calculated using Cantera and GRI 3.0 mechanism
Maximum burning velocity (m/s)	3.15	0.385	Calculated using Cantera and GRI 3.0 mechanism
Heat of vaporization (J/g)*	454.6	510.4	ISO ¹⁾ , Annex A, Table A.3
Lower flammability limit (% vol. fraction)***	4	5.3	ISO ¹⁾ , Annex B, Table B.2
Upper flammability limit (% vol. fraction)***	77	17.0	ISO ¹⁾ , Annex B, Table B.2
Minimum ignition energy (mJ)***	0.017	0.274	ISO ¹⁾ , Annex B, Table B.2
Auto-ignition temperature***	858	810	ISO ¹⁾ , Annex B, Table B.2
Toxicity	Non	Non	Orange book ⁵⁾
Temperature at critical point (K)	33.19****	190.55	Hydrogen: ISO ¹⁾ , Annex A, Table A.1 Methane: The Japan Society of Mechanical Engineers, Data Book, Thermophysical Properties of Fluids (1983)
Pressure at critical point (kPaA)	1315****	4595	Hydrogen: ISO ¹⁾ , Annex A, Table A.1 Methane: The Japan Society of Mechanical Engineers, Data Book, Thermophysical Properties of Fluids (1983)

Remarks: * At their normal boiling points for comparison purposes.
 ** At normal temperature and pressure.
 *** Ignition and combustion properties for air mixtures at 25°C and 101.3 kPaA.
 **** Normal Hydrogen.

3.2 Explanation on respective requirements

3.2.1 Ship type (column 'c')

As the hazard associated with hydrogen cargo is flammability but not toxicity, the ship type is considered 2G.

3.2.2 Independent tank type C required (column 'd')

Independent tank type C is allocated only to dangerous goods of class 2.3 whose vapour density is heavier than air. Independent tank type C is considered not to be required for liquefied hydrogen.

3.2.3 Control of vapour space within cargo tank (column 'e')

Special environment controls such as drying and inerting are generally required for liquid chemical products in consideration of the reactivity of cargo vapour and air. As is the case for LNG, it is considered not to be necessary to apply such requirements for liquefied hydrogen.

3.2.4 Vapour detection (column 'f')

Because hydrogen is flammable and non-toxic, it is appropriate to require Flammable (F) as vapour detection for liquefied hydrogen.

3.2.5 Gauging (column 'g')

On the grounds that Closed (C) gauging is required, in principle, for flammable or toxic cargoes, such as methane, it is considered to be appropriate to require Closed (C) gauging for hydrogen, taking into account that hydrogen has high ignitability and a wide flammable range in air and that closed gauging is effective to prevent leakage of gases into air.

4 SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS AGAINST HAZARDS OF LIQUEFIED HYDROGEN

4.1 Hazards of liquefied hydrogen to be considered

4.1.1 The hazards related to liquefied hydrogen are low ignition energy, a wide range of flammability limits, low visibility of flames in case of fire, high flame velocity which may lead to the detonation with shockwave, low temperature and liquefaction/solidification of inert gas and constituents of air which may result in an oxygen-enriched atmosphere, high permeation, low viscosity, and hydrogen embrittlement including weld metals. Where vacuum insulation is adopted, due consideration should be given to the possibility of untimely deterioration of insulation properties at the envisaged carriage temperatures of liquid hydrogen. The vacuum insulation evaluation should be specified for the normal range or upper limit of cold vacuum pressure (CVP), and loss of vacuum should be defined with respect to this value. Accordingly, the effect of vacuum pressure should be taken into account at the time of design and testing of piping with vacuum insulation. Supporting structure and adjacent hull structure should be designed taking into account the cooling owing to loss of vacuum insulation.

4.1.2 Hydrogen is essentially a mixture of ortho- and para-hydrogen, with an equilibrium concentration of 75% ortho-hydrogen and 25% para-hydrogen at ambient temperature. When liquefied at 20K, there is a slow but continuous transformation of ortho-hydrogen to para-hydrogen. The exothermic conversion of the nuclear spin isomers of hydrogen (ortho- to para-hydrogen) may take place and the effect of the conversion may have an impact on the cooling capacity and relief valve capacity of the vessel's equipment.

4.1.3 Trace amounts of air will condense or solidify in an environment with liquid hydrogen possibly resulting in an unstable and explosive mixture. Precautions should be taken to assure that the possibility of condensed air is accounted for within properly secured hazard areas.

4.2 Low temperature hazard

4.2.1 Selection of appropriate material

4.2.1.1 Tables 6.3 and 6.4 in the Code prescribe material selection for piping or cargo tanks whose design temperature is -165°C or higher. According to Note 2 of table 6.3 and Note 3 of table 6.4 of the Code, the requirements for materials whose design temperatures are lower than -165°C should be specially agreed with the Administration. In this regard, the publication by AIAA²⁾ introduces some appropriate materials corresponding to the design temperature and the Administration should take into account such references for the material selection.

4.2.1.2 Although paragraph 4.19.3 in the Code requires testing of materials used for thermal insulation for various properties adequate for the intended service temperature, the minimum test temperature is -196°C . The requirements in the Code do not refer to the normal boiling point of hydrogen, being -253°C . In case of carriage of liquefied hydrogen, special requirements should be provided to consider the lower design temperature.

4.2.2 Measures for condensed air

4.2.2.1 In the case of nitrogen whose normal boiling point is -196°C , for which air condensation and oxygen enrichment are concerns, the following special requirement has already been included in paragraph 17.17 in the Code:

"Material of construction and ancillary equipment such as insulation shall be resistant to the effect of high oxygen concentrations caused by condensation and enrichment at the low temperatures attained in parts of the cargo system. Due consideration shall be given to ventilation in such areas where condensation might occur to avoid the stratification of oxygen-enriched atmosphere."

A similar special requirement is applicable to hydrogen.

4.2.2.2 A vent may be blocked by accumulation of ice formed from moisture in the air, which may result in excessive pressure leading to rupture of the vent and relevant piping (see paragraph 4.2.4).

4.2.3 Removal of impure substances condensed

The removal of impure substances, such as those contained in condensate in pipes, should be separately considered. Installation of filters can be an appropriate measure and should be stipulated as a special requirement.

4.2.4 Prevention of blockage due to formation of water or ice

Pressure relief systems may become blocked owing to the formation of water or ice, depending on the temperature and humidity of air, resulting from the low temperature of the cargo and its vapour (see paragraph 4.2.2). Appropriate means should be provided to prevent such phenomena.

4.3 Hydrogen embrittlement

4.3.1 Selection of appropriate materials should be required to prevent failures owing to hydrogen embrittlement. The publication by AIAA²⁾ introduces some appropriate materials resistant to hydrogen embrittlement, and concludes that aluminium is the material least affected.

4.3.2 International or national standards should be followed for the selection of materials for the design of liquefied and gaseous hydrogen installations in a marine environment.

4.4 Susceptibility to leakage

4.4.1 Prevention of leakage from pipes

To mitigate undetected accumulation of hydrogen in a confined space, effective measures should be employed to reduce the possibility of leakage of hydrogen, taking its leakage characteristics into account. Effective measures can be double tube structures, or fixed hydrogen leak detectors in areas assessed as being highly hazardous with regard to hydrogen leakage. Hydrogen leakage through welds, joints and seals is an important consideration for the design of hydrogen systems and an important operational issue.

4.4.2 Implementation of effective tightness test

4.4.2.1 Tightness tests for cargo tanks and cargo pipes/valves are required by paragraphs 4.20.3.2, 5.13.1 and 5.13.2.3 in the Code respectively. Helium or a mixture of 5% hydrogen and 95% nitrogen should be used as the medium for tightness tests, instead of air, because hydrogen is highly susceptible to leakage.

4.4.2.2 For a hydrogen installation, the pipework should be pressure-tested at its design pressure. Consideration should be given to using oxygen-free nitrogen with a small molecule tracer gas, such as helium as the test medium and an electronic leak detector for identifying leaks.

4.4.3 Confirmation of appropriate operating procedure

Instructions/manuals containing the operating procedures for the prevention of leakage during transport, methods for early detection in case of leakage, and appropriate measures after such events, should be provided. For this, paragraph 18.3 of the Code requires that the information shall be on board and available to all concerned, giving the necessary data for the safe carriage of cargo. In detail, the Code requires such information on action to be taken in the event of spills or leak, countermeasures against accidental personal contact, procedures for cargo transfer, and emergency procedures to be on board. With regard to the manuals on procedures for liquefied hydrogen during carriage and transfer operations, the requirements in the Code are applicable and no special requirement is necessary.

4.5 Low density and high diffusivity

Though low density and high diffusivity of hydrogen may reduce the possibility of formation of a flammable atmosphere in open spaces, adequate ventilation is necessary for enclosed spaces in cargo areas where formation of hydrogen-oxygen/air mixture may occur. Paragraph 12.2 of the Code requires fixed ventilation systems or portable mechanical ventilation for such enclosed spaces. These requirements in the Code are applicable to liquefied hydrogen carriers and no special requirement is necessary in this regard.

4.6 Ignitability

4.6.1 The Code requires electrical bonds of the piping and the cargo tanks in paragraph 5.7.4, exclusion of all sources of ignition in paragraph 11.1.2, electrical installations to minimize the risk of fire and explosion from flammable products in paragraph 10.2.1 and so on, in order to prevent ignition of flammable cargoes.

4.6.2 The Code requires compliance with the relevant standards issued by the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) and the IEC standards specify the details of such safety measures depending on the respective properties of flammable gases including hydrogen. No special requirement is necessary with regard to ignitability of hydrogen.²

4.7 Fire hazard

4.7.1 Safety of personnel in case of fire

To avoid the effects of flame and UV radiation produced by a hydrogen fire, it is effective to use fire-fighter's outfits and protective equipment. The Code already requires fire-fighter's outfits for ships carrying flammable products in paragraph 11.6.1 and safety equipment in paragraph 14.3. This issue should be considered as the matter of cargo information required by paragraph 18.3 of the Code. Due consideration should be given to the invisible nature of hydrogen fire.

4.7.2 Compatibility of fire-extinguishing systems

Dry chemical powder fire-extinguishing or carbon dioxide fire-extinguishing systems are considered to be effective in case of hydrogen fire and such fire-extinguishing systems are already required by paragraphs 11.4 and 11.5 of the Code. Special requirements for installation of other types of fire-extinguishing systems are considered unnecessary, except with regard to the increase in the amount of carbon dioxide required, as mentioned in the next paragraph in this document.

4.7.3 Increase of the amount of gas for carbon dioxide fire-extinguishing systems

4.7.3.1 Paragraph 11.5.1 of the Code requires as follows:

"Enclosed spaces meeting the criteria of cargo machinery spaces in 1.2.10, and the cargo motor room within the cargo area of any ship, shall be provided with a fixed fire-extinguishing system complying with the provisions of the FSS Code and taking into account the necessary concentrations/application rate required for extinguishing gas fires."

4.7.3.2 Chapter 5 of the FSS Code, i.e. Fixed gas fire-extinguishing systems, requires that the quantity of carbon dioxide for cargo spaces, unless otherwise provided, shall be sufficient to give a minimum volume of free gas equal to 30% of the gross volume of the largest cargo space to be protected in the ship, in paragraph 2.2.1.1.

4.7.3.3 On the other hand, NFPA 12³⁾ requires that the design quantity of carbon dioxide for hydrogen fire should be 75% or more of the gross volume of the protected space. The special requirement for an increased amount of carbon dioxide should be provided for carbon dioxide fire-extinguishing systems.

² Electrical equipment used in hydrogen/air mixture should be, at least, the type of "II-C" and "T-1" as the group based on the maximum experimental safe gap for flameproof enclosures and the temperature class based on maximum surface temperature, respectively, according to ISO/IEC 80079-20-1⁴⁾.

4.7.4 Features of hydrogen fire

Hydrogen burns at high temperature, but generally gives off less radiant heat than propane or other hydrocarbons (e.g. only about 10% of that radiated by an equal-sized propane flame). Although the heat radiated by a hydrogen flame is also relatively low compared to hydrocarbons, it is important to take into account the differences in heats of combustion, burning rate and flame size. Hydrogen flames are colourless or nearly colourless. Both of these characteristics make it more difficult to detect a hydrogen fire. Even relatively small hydrogen fires are very difficult to extinguish. The only reliable approach to extinguish a fire is to shut off the source of hydrogen supply.

4.8 High pressure hazard

4.8.1 High pressure is a hazard common to hydrogen and other flammable gases listed in the Code. To prevent overpressure, the Code requires various measures such as pressure control and pressure design. Specifically, paragraph 8.2, in regard to the provision of pressure control of cargo tanks, requires fittings of pressure relief valves to the cargo tanks. Furthermore, paragraph 7.1.1 requires temperature control by the use of mechanical refrigeration and/or design to withstand possible increases of temperature and pressure. In addition, paragraph 15.2 specifies the filling limit of cargo tanks taking into account cargo volume increase by its thermal expansion. These requirements are applicable for hydrogen and no special requirement is considered necessary in this regard.

4.8.2 Boil-off may be a more significant issue for hydrogen than for LNG in particular when insulation properties have deteriorated. Means of handling boil-off gas should be carefully considered taking into account the following issues:

- .1 Re-liquefaction of hydrogen involves very specific and costly equipment. Cargo cooling in order to avoid boil-off shows the same kind of issues; and
- .2 Notwithstanding the provision in paragraph 7.4.1 of the Code, thermal oxidation of hydrogen may be permitted in accordance with paragraph 1.3 of the Code.

4.8.3 The special requirements in these aspects are considered necessary.

4.9 Health hazard

4.9.1 Human safety concern under low temperature

With regard to the influences of cold hydrogen on persons' bodies, suitable protective equipment is effective. In this aspect, paragraph 14.1 of the Code requires suitable protective equipment taking into account the character of the products, therefore, no special requirement is considered necessary.

4.9.2 Static electricity

Hydrogen ignition energy is very low and hydrogen can be easily ignitable by static electricity and due consideration should be given to this issue, in accordance with the requirement in the Code on suitable protective equipment.

4.9.3 Oxygen depletion and asphyxiation

Leakage of hydrogen may cause a low level of oxygen and associated asphyxiation.

4.10 Wide range of flammable limits

4.10.1 Extinguishing hydrogen fire

4.10.1.1 As mentioned in paragraph 4.6, for flammable products the Code already requires elimination of sources of ignition, including use of electrical installations of appropriate types in order to minimize the risk of fire and explosion. No special requirement is considered necessary with regard to ignitability of hydrogen.

4.10.1.2 Furthermore, with regard to the wide range of flammable limits of hydrogen, the increased quantities of carbon dioxide as a fire-extinguishing medium should be specified as mentioned in paragraph 4.7. No additional special requirement is considered to be necessary with regard to the wide range of flammable limits of hydrogen.

4.10.2 Disposal of cold hydrogen gas

The wide flammability range makes disposal of cold hydrogen gas a major hazard. Cold plumes of released hydrogen may impede adequate dilution of hydrogen down to below 4% and may lead to flash-back to the vent from distant ignition sources outside safety-controlled areas. The low ignition energy and wide flammable range may present significant challenges.

4.11 Prevention of dangerous purging operation

4.11.1 During cargo operations for maintenance, pipes and tanks should be purged with an inert gas or inert gases as illustrated in the figure below. For safety, due consideration should be given to temperature and boiling points of the inert gases. Residual pockets of hydrogen or the purge gas will remain in the enclosure if the purging rate, duration, or extent of mixing is too low. Therefore, reliable gas concentration measurements should be obtained at a number of different locations within the system for suitable purges. Temperature should also be measured at a number of locations. Oxidizing agents may exist in a hydrogen containing equipment, specifically: air, cold box atmospheres containing air diluted with nitrogen, or oxygen-enriched air that can be condensed on process pipe work within the cold box in special circumstances.

4.11.2 There are special measures that may need to be put in place in order to mitigate the hazards, e.g. air should be eliminated by nitrogen purge prior to introduction of hydrogen into cargo piping or processing equipment. Nitrogen should then be eliminated by hydrogen purge, where there is a possibility of its solidification in the subsequent process.




Figure 1

References in part A

- 1 ISO/TR 15916:2015, Basic consideration for the safety of hydrogen systems (ISO)
- 2 American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, "Safety Standard for Hydrogen and Hydrogen Systems (Guide to Safety of Hydrogen and Hydrogen Systems)", 2005 (AIAA)
- 3 NFPA 12: Standard on Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing Systems 2020 Edition (NFPA)
- 4 ISO/IEC 80079-20-1:2017 Explosive atmospheres – Part 20-1: Material characteristics for gas and vapour classification – Test methods and data
- 5 UN Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods – Model Regulations, twenty-second revised edition
- 6 NFPA 2: Hydrogen Technologies Code 2016 Edition (NFPA)
- 7 IEC/ISO 31010: 2019 Risk management – Risk assessment techniques
- 8 Cryogenics Safety Manual – Fourth Edition (1998)
- 9 SAE ARP 5580-2001 "Recommended failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) practices for non-automobile applications"
- 10 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) RefProp database

Part B

Cargo containment systems of independent cargo tanks using vacuum insulation

5 Additional requirements

5.1 Additional special requirements for cargo containment systems of independent cargo tanks using vacuum insulation are prescribed in table 4 and these special requirements should apply in addition to the requirements in table 2.

Table 4: Special requirements for cargo containment systems of independent cargo tanks using vacuum insulation

No.	Special requirement	Related hazard
B-1	The insulation performance of vacuum insulation of cargo containment system should be evaluated to the satisfaction of the Administration based on experiments, as necessary.	General (see 4.1 and 6.1)
B-2	Notwithstanding special requirement A-22, liquid and gas hydrogen pipes may pass through spaces constituting a part of a cargo containment system using vacuum insulation where the degree of vacuum is monitored.	Susceptibility to leakage (see 4.4)
B-3	When selecting the most onerous scenario stipulated in special requirement A-24, the evaluation should include fire or loss of vacuum from the overall insulation system and should also consider the resulting magnitude of the heat flux in case of a single failure on the cargo containment system in each case.	High pressure hazard (see 4.8 and 6.2)

6 Additional special requirements to mitigate hazards of liquefied hydrogen

6.1 Hazards of liquefied hydrogen to be considered

6.1.1 In addition to 4.1.1, due consideration should be given to the possibility of untimely deterioration of insulation properties at the envisaged carriage temperatures of liquid hydrogen. The vacuum insulation evaluation should be specified for the normal range or upper limit of cold vacuum pressure (CVP), and loss of vacuum should be defined with respect to this value. Accordingly, the effect of vacuum pressure should be taken into account at the time of design and testing of cargo containment systems. Supporting structure and adjacent hull structure should be designed taking into account the cooling owing to loss of vacuum insulation.

6.1.2 For consideration on the special requirements for this part, bibliographic studies were conducted using the references at the end of this document, in particular, ISO/TR 15916¹⁾, "High Pressure Gas Safety Act" (Japanese law), "Safety standard for hydrogen and hydrogen system" by AIAA²⁾ and NFPA 2 "Hydrogen Technologies Code"³⁾. The majority of special requirements for liquefied hydrogen carriers are provided based on ISO/TR 15916. This standard refers to liquefied hydrogen tank storage facilities on shore, tank trucks and so on, and includes basic viewpoints when discussing the properties of liquefied hydrogen.

6.2 High pressure hazard

In addition to 4.8, vacuum insulation systems are likely to be used for liquefied hydrogen containment systems and the insulation capability of such systems may be adversely affected by damage to the system, depending on the design of the system. If a rapid deterioration of the insulation system took place, rapid increase of temperature in the cargo tank would occur and/or the rate of vaporization of liquefied hydrogen might exceed the capacity of pressure relief valves. To prevent such dangerous deterioration of insulation, appropriate safety measures should be taken.

References in part B

- 1 ISO/TR 15916:2015, Basic consideration for the safety of hydrogen systems (ISO)
- 2 American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, "Safety Standard for Hydrogen and Hydrogen Systems (Guide to Safety of Hydrogen and Hydrogen Systems)", 2005 (AIAA)
- 3 NFPA 2: Hydrogen Technologies Code 2016 Edition (NFPA)

Part C

Cargo containment systems of independent cargo tanks using insulation materials and hydrogen gas in the inner insulation spaces

7 Application of the requirements in this part

7.1 Design of cargo containment systems

The safety measures set out in this part should apply to cargo containment systems of independent cargo tanks using insulation materials and hydrogen gas in the inner insulation spaces as described below.

Figure 2 illustrates a cargo containment system of independent cargo tanks using insulation materials and hydrogen gas in the inner insulation spaces. In this cargo containment system, an inner shell corresponds to a cargo tank. An insulation structure is installed outside of the inner shell. The insulation structure consists of an inner insulation space, an outer shell and an outer

insulation layer from the inside. The inner insulation layer, which is located outside the inner shell, is a part of the inner insulation space. The inner insulation space needs to be filled with the appropriate gas to prevent condensation and/or solidification of a large amount of gas caused by the low temperature of the inner shell surface, which will be almost equal to the boiling point of hydrogen. Thus, the inner insulation space is filled with hydrogen gas and no liquid.




Figure 2 Illustration of cargo containment system

7.2 Conditions for the application of the requirements in this part

The safety requirements set out in this part should apply under the following conditions of use:

- .1 the inner shell satisfies the requirements of the Code for a cargo tank; and

Note: This part focuses on the safety measures for the inner insulation space and the outer shell, as a part of the insulation structure for which no specific requirements are specified in the Code.
- .2 appropriate measures are adopted to prevent leakage of gas from the inner insulation space to ensure the reliability of the insulation structure, taking into account that the space is filled with flammable gas.

8 Additional requirements

Special requirements for the cargo containment systems are prescribed in table 5 and these special requirements should apply in addition to the requirements in table 2.

Table 5: Special requirements for cargo containment systems of independent cargo tanks using insulation materials and hydrogen gas in the inner insulation spaces

No.	Special requirement	Explanation
C-1	The outer shell of the cargo containment system should be located at the distance from the ship's outer shell, as required in paragraphs 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 of the Code for cargo tanks of type 2G ship.	
C-2	Strength of the outer shell should be determined by analyses and tests considering safety principles, all applicable design conditions, materials used, and construction processes in reference to chapter 4 of the Code, and should be approved by the Administration.	
C-3	Notwithstanding special requirement C-2, the temperature of the outer shell should be determined by a temperature calculation, under the assumption that the inner shell is at the cargo temperature.	
C-4	The following special requirements should be applied to the outer shell: .1 All joints of the outer shell should be welded and of full penetration type. All joints of the outer shell should be of in-plane butt weld, as far as practicable. Tee welds of full penetration type may be used depending on the results of the test carried out at the approval of the welding procedure where the in-plane butt weld is not practicable owing to the construction process and structure of the outer shell. .2 If a manhole is sealed by welding using backing rings, backing rings may be left after welding without removal, provided that they do not cause any significant harmful effects.	see 9.1
C-5	The outer shell should be subjected to pneumatic pressure testing to check its strength.	see 9.2
C-6	Appropriate thermal insulation should be provided to keep the temperature of the outer shell and outer insulation layer above the boiling point of oxygen. The insulation performance should be evaluated to the satisfaction of the Administration based on experiments, as necessary. When applying paragraph 4.19.1.1.5 of the Code, the degradation of insulation performance caused by a hydrogen atmosphere should be considered. Means should be provided for monitoring the condition of the insulation for detection of failures.	
C-7	The pressure of the inner insulation space should be monitored taking into account the requirement for a cargo tank in paragraph 13.4 of the Code.	see 9.3
C-8	Under normal conditions, appropriate measures should be taken to maintain the pressure of the inner insulation space within the design limits.	see 9.3

No.	Special requirement	Explanation
C-9	Pressure and vacuum relief valves should be provided for inner insulation space which may be subject to pressures beyond their design capabilities, taking into account the requirements for pressure relief systems of cargo tanks in paragraphs 8.2 and 8.3 of the Code. The appropriate capacity of vacuum relief valves should be provided taking into account the expected rate of pressure drop in the inner insulation space of the cargo tanks of the ship under normal cargo operations, which replaces the requirements of paragraph 8.3.1.2 of the Code. When applying 8.3.2 of the Code, the vacuum relief valves should not admit air to the inner insulation space. In the event that the pressure relief valve for the inner insulation space is activated, the hydrogen gas release should be vented to a safe location.	see 9.3
C-10	The requirements in chapter 5 other than 5.3 and 5.10 of the Code, i.e. the requirements for cargo piping outside the cargo areas, should be applied for piping handling hydrogen for the inner insulation space.	
C-11	Appropriate measures should be taken for atmosphere control of the inner insulation space, e.g. inerting, gas freeing, aerating and purging, etc. (see also A-15).	
C-12	The special requirement A-8 should be applied to the tightness test of the outer shell.	
C-13	The special requirements A-3 and A-4 should be applied to piping handling hydrogen for the inner insulation space.	
C-14	The special requirements A-8 and A-26 should be applied to exposed parts of piping handling hydrogen for the inner insulation space.	
C-15	Special requirement A-7 need not be applied to piping handling hydrogen for the inner insulation space, other than piping penetrating the inner shell, located inside the inner insulation space.	see 9.4
C-16	Notwithstanding special requirement A-22, piping handling hydrogen for an inner insulation space may pass through other inner insulation spaces.	
C-17	The requirements for type C independent tank should be applied to the inner shell.	
C-18	Manholes for access from or to the inner insulation space through the inner shell should not be permitted.	
C-19	Cargo piping connected to the inside of the inner shell should be led directly from the weather deck. No pipe should penetrate the inner shell from or to the inner insulation space.	

9 Explanation of special requirements

9.1 Welding of the outer shell

9.1.1 As mentioned in 7.2, the outer shell is a part of the insulation structure that has the function to contain hydrogen gas in the inner insulation space, but not to contain liquefied hydrogen.

9.1.2 Owing to the high leakage of hydrogen, which is filled in the inner insulation space, it is essential to ensure the reliability of the tightness of the outer shell. This reliability is subject to evaluation and approval by the Administration. To ensure the tightness of the outer shell, equivalent welding requirements for the inner shell, i.e. cargo tank, should be applied to the outer shell as far as practicable. Therefore, all joints of the outer shell should be of the in-plane butt weld full penetration type, referring to paragraph 4.20.1 of the Code. On the other hand, it may not be practicable to use in-plane butt weld for the outer shell owing to the construction procedure and structure. Considering that only gas is filled in the inner insulation space, no liquid pressure is applied on the outer shell. Therefore, using tee welds of the full penetration type is deemed acceptable for those areas, depending on the results of the test carried out with the approval of the welding procedure.

9.1.3 A manhole, when installed on the outer shell, can be sealed by gaskets or by welding. Welding is deemed to be a more reliable method to prevent hydrogen leakage, and removal of the backing rings is typically not possible owing to the construction procedure. Considering that no liquid pressure is applied on manholes and backing rings, there is no significant concern from a strength point of view. Therefore, not removing backing rings is deemed acceptable, unless any conceivable harmful effects, such as fatigue strength, are identified.

9.2 Testing of outer shell

While pressure testing is to be conducted on the outer shell to check for strength, filling the inner insulation space with water is unrealistic because the insulation materials are installed in the inner insulation space. In addition, it is assumed that only gas is stored in the inner insulation space, therefore, a pneumatic pressure test is sufficient to reproduce the operational condition of the outer shell. This special requirement is related to paragraphs 4.20.3.1 and 4.23.6.7 of the Code.

9.3 Pressure of the inner insulation space

Keeping an appropriate pressure of the inner insulation space is essential for preventing the inner and the outer shell from rupturing and buckling.

9.4 Leak detection for piping handling hydrogen for the inner insulation space located inside the inner insulation space

The purpose of special requirement A-7 is to avoid forming a flammable atmosphere. Because the inner insulation space is filled with hydrogen, no additional risk is created by leakage of hydrogen from the places, located inside the inner insulation space, where leakage of hydrogen may occur such as valves, flanges and seals of piping handling hydrogen for the inner insulation space. Thus, special requirement A-7 does not contribute to improve safety for such piping, which is different from the piping for cargo handling. Provision C-15 is necessary to enable the design for control to change atmosphere or for maintenance.

References in part C

- 1 ISO/TR 15916:2015, Basic consideration for the safety of hydrogen systems (ISO)
- 2 American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, "Safety Standard for Hydrogen and Hydrogen Systems (Guide to Safety of Hydrogen and Hydrogen Systems)", 2005 (AIAA)
- 3 NFPA 2: Hydrogen Technologies Code 2016 Edition (NFPA)

Part D

Cargo containment systems of membrane-type cargo tanks maintaining the insulation spaces under vacuum

10 APPLICATION OF THE REQUIREMENTS IN THIS PART

10.1 Definitions

The following definitions apply for the purpose of this part;

- .1 the *primary insulation space* is the inter-barrier space as defined in 1.2.30 of the Code; and
- .2 the *secondary insulation space* is the space between the secondary barrier and the inner hull.

10.2 Design of the cargo containment system

The safety measures set out in this part should apply to membrane-type cargo containment systems for liquefied hydrogen maintaining the insulation spaces under vacuum, as an equivalent arrangement under paragraph 1.3 of the Code to the inerting requirements specified in paragraph 9.2.1.

Figure 3 illustrates an example of the cargo containment system. The system consists of thin liquid-tight and gas-tight layers (denoted as primary and secondary barriers in figure 3) supported through insulation by the adjacent hull structure. The primary and secondary insulation spaces are filled with insulation materials, and maintained under vacuum during the normal operation of the containment system.




Figure 3: Illustration of a membrane LH₂ cargo containment system maintaining the insulation spaces under vacuum

11 ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS

Instead of filling the insulation spaces with dry inert gas, the cargo containment system creates and maintains vacuum in the spaces. Therefore, additional safety requirements should be provided for:

- .1 structural integrity of the inner hull, primary and secondary barriers and insulation components in the spaces under vacuum environment;
- .2 generation, maintaining, and monitoring of the vacuum; and
- .3 emergency cases: cargo leakage into the primary insulation space or loss of vacuum due to air ingress into the insulation spaces.

The additional requirements are prescribed in table 6 and these special requirements should be applied in addition to the requirements in table 2.

Table 6: Special requirements for membrane-type cargo containment systems maintaining the insulation spaces under vacuum

No.	Special requirement	Explanation
D-1	Structural integrity should be verified for all the structural components of the cargo containment system and the inner hull structure considering the vacuum environment of the insulation spaces.	12.1.1

No.	Special requirement	Explanation
D-2	Both the primary and secondary barriers should be made of metallic materials and be liquid-tight and gas-tight. The quality assurance/quality control programme ensuring the continued conformity of the weld procedure qualification, design details, materials, construction, inspection and production testing of components, should be established to the satisfaction of the Administration.	12.1.2
D-3	Tightness test should be conducted for both the primary and secondary barriers after installation and during renewal surveys using the test medium specified in the requirement A-8.	12.1.2
D-4	Pressure relief system should be provided for the insulation spaces that may be subject to pressures beyond their design capabilities. The designer should demonstrate adequate capacity of the pressure relief system for the spaces to the satisfaction of the Administration.	12.1.2
D-5	Procedures for the in-service maintenance and monitoring, initial and periodical examination/test for the primary and secondary insulation spaces, should be established to the satisfaction of the Administration.	12.1.3
D-6	The insulation performance of the insulation system should be evaluated to the satisfaction of the Administration considering the anticipated operational conditions, the degree of vacuum, vacuum deterioration over time and the designed tolerance levels in the insulation spaces, based on experiments as necessary.	12.2.1
D-7	The required degree of vacuum in the insulation spaces should be adequate to prevent any damage to the insulation system components due to the condensation and/or solidification of the remaining gas components.	12.2.1
D-8	The degree of vacuum in the insulation spaces should be monitored and maintained within the designed level during the normal operation period. At least one vacuum system should be provided for each tank. The vacuum system should have sufficient capacity to maintain the designed level of vacuum in each insulation space. The vacuum systems are to be considered as an essential auxiliary and at least one of them for each tank should be supplied from the emergency source of electrical power. In addition, a back-up pump should be provided, able to maintain vacuum in the largest space under vacuum.	12.2.2
D-9	In addition to the requirement A-15, appropriate atmosphere handling procedures for the insulation spaces should also be established. It should be verified through testing that the insulation components do not prevent the effective atmosphere control operation for the spaces, including but not limited to gas displacement, evacuation and removal of leaked hydrogen.	12.2.3

No.	Special requirement	Explanation
D-10	Appropriate emergency control procedures should be established to address the possibility of cargo leakage into the primary insulation space. The procedures should include, but not be limited to, leakage detection, handling of leaked hydrogen and measures to restore insulation performance and tightness of the primary barrier.	12.3.1.1
D-11	For the detection and identification of the emergency cases, such as hydrogen leakage into the primary insulation space and loss of vacuum due to air ingress into the insulation spaces, appropriate indicating and detecting instruments should be provided and arranged. They should be sufficiently redundant to the satisfaction of the Administration.	12.3.1
D-12	Pressure control systems for the primary insulation space, such as pressure relief or vacuum pumping systems, should be explosion-proof and be able to discharge cryogenic hydrogen to a safe location with sufficient capacity. Pressure control systems for the primary and secondary insulation spaces should also be designed and arranged to prevent blockage due to the frozen air or loose/damaged insulation material.	12.3.1
D-13	Hydrogen-compatibility of the insulation materials should be verified by test. It should be ensured that the insulation performance of the insulation materials in contact with the leaked hydrogen remains acceptable to the satisfaction of the Administration after repair works are completed.	12.3.1
D-14	The insulation components' low permeability to hydrogen should be demonstrated or adequate measures and operating procedures to avoid any risk of potential damage due to the permeated hydrogen should be provided to the satisfaction of the Administration.	12.3.1.4
D-15	To prevent air intrusion into the insulation spaces, the number of pipes passing through the spaces should be minimized, and furthermore, all the pipe joints connected to the spaces should be weld-type.	12.3.2
D-16	Appropriate measures should be provided to control the incoming air and prevent further ingress when outside air intrudes into the secondary insulation space. The measures should be effective for at least 15 days. When the secondary insulation space is pressurized with an inert gas as one of the measures to prevent further ingress of air, appropriate measures should be adopted taking into account the possibility of condensation of the inert gas within the space, such as maintaining the temperature of the inner boundary of the secondary insulation space above the boiling point of the inert gas.	12.3.2.2
D-17	Insulation system and the inner hull structure's steel grade should be arranged to safely accommodate a degradation or loss of the insulation performance in any one of the insulation spaces.	-

No.	Special requirement	Explanation
D-18	Regarding the relief valve sizing for the cargo tank, the evaluation should include the scenarios of fire or loss of vacuum in any one of the insulation spaces in addition to the special requirement A-24.	-

12 EXPLANATION OF THE SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS

12.1 Structural integrity of the components

12.1.1 *Strength assessment under vacuum environment*

In addition to the design loads described in the Code, chapter 4, part B, a strength assessment should be carried out for the inner hull structure, primary and secondary barriers and the structural components in the insulation spaces, taking into account the vacuum pressure for the anticipated operating scenarios.

12.1.2 *The inner hull, primary and secondary barriers*

12.1.2.1 Liquid and gas tightness is required for the inner hull and both the primary and secondary barriers so that the vacuum environment can be maintained during the operation period and also any leaked hydrogen can be contained in the primary insulation space without permeation into the secondary insulation space for at least 15 days.

12.1.2.2 The quality assurance/quality control programme should ensure the continued conformity of the weld procedure qualification, design details, materials, construction, inspection and production testing of components, according to 6.6.5 of the Code. The programme should be developed and established to the satisfaction of the Administration. Tightness test specified in A-8 should be conducted for both the primary and secondary barriers.

12.1.2.3 In addition to 8.2.2 of the Code, the secondary insulation space should be provided with a pressure relief system as well as the inter-barrier space, if the space may be subject to pressures beyond its capability. The capacity of the pressure relief system of the insulation spaces should be adequately determined and demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Administration.

12.1.3 *Maintenance, monitoring and examination*

Procedures for the in-service maintenance and monitoring, initial and periodical examination/test for the primary and secondary insulation spaces, should be established to the satisfaction of the Administration.

12.2 Vacuum control in the insulation spaces

12.2.1 *Required degree of vacuum*

12.2.1.1 The insulation performance is affected by the degree of vacuum. If the cold vacuum pressure (CVP) is taken into account in the evaluation of the insulation performance, the required degree of vacuum should be determined based on the evaluation conditions. The vacuum insulation evaluation should be specified for the normal range or upper limit of cold vacuum pressure, and loss of vacuum should be defined with respect to this value.

12.2.1.2 Owing to the low temperature of the cargo, the remaining gas components can be condensed and/or solidified. Therefore, the required degree of vacuum should also be determined so as to prevent any damage to the insulation system components by condensation and/or solidification of the remaining gas components in the spaces.

12.2.2 *Monitoring and maintaining the degree of vacuum*

The degree of vacuum in the insulation spaces should be monitored and maintained within the designed level throughout the normal operation period. Appropriate vacuum systems, such as a vacuum pumping system, should be permanently installed, and they should have sufficient capacity and redundancy to the satisfaction of the Administration.

12.2.3 *Atmosphere handling*

In addition to the special requirement A-15, an appropriate procedure should also be established for the atmosphere handling within the insulation spaces. Purging with dry inert gas may be conducted before creating a vacuum in the insulation spaces to prevent the formation of a flammable mixture as much as possible. As the insulation spaces are filled with insulation materials, it should be confirmed that they do not disable the gas displacement and evacuation operations for the spaces. In addition, considering the cargo leakage scenario, leaked hydrogen may permeate inside the insulation materials. The methodology of removing the permeated hydrogen should also be prepared and verified to ensure that repair works after the leakage can be safely carried out.

12.3 *Emergency control*

12.3.1 *Cargo leakage into the primary insulation space*

12.3.1.1 Appropriate emergency control procedures should be established to address the possibility of cargo leakage into the primary insulation space. The procedures should include, but not be limited to, leakage detection, handling of leaked hydrogen and measures to restore insulation performance and tightness of the primary barrier.

12.3.1.2 Any cargo leakage into the primary insulation space may be detected and identified by hydrogen gas detectors together with monitoring the pressure and temperature changes in the insulation space. Meanwhile, air ingress into the primary or secondary insulation space may be detected and identified by oxygen detectors together with monitoring the pressure changes in the insulation spaces. Appropriate indicating and detecting instruments should be provided and arranged. They should be sufficiently redundant to the satisfaction of the Administration.

12.3.1.3 Cargo hydrogen may leak into the primary insulation space. Therefore, the pressure control systems, such as pressure relief valves or vacuum pumping systems installed for the primary insulation space, should be able to discharge the leaked hydrogen to a safe location. They should also be explosion-proof and be able to handle cryogenic gas.

12.3.1.4 Any leaked hydrogen in the primary insulation space may permeate into the insulation materials and cause damage to the barriers and/or insulation components as it heats up. It can also cause degradation of the insulation performance. Therefore, the insulation components' low permeability to hydrogen should be demonstrated or adequate measures and operating procedures to avoid any risk of potential damage due to the permeated hydrogen should be provided to the satisfaction of the Administration.

12.3.2 Loss of vacuum in the insulation spaces due to air intrusion

12.3.2.1 In case of external leakage on the pipes or valves connected to the primary or secondary insulation spaces, outside air may intrude into the spaces. In the primary insulation space, the air intrusion may not be detected for some time if the amount of ingress is small, because it immediately condenses owing to the extremely low temperature. Therefore, the design should prevent air intrusion into the primary and secondary insulation spaces as much as possible. The number of pipes passing through the spaces should be limited to a minimum and only weld-type pipe joints should be allowed.

12.3.2.2 In the secondary insulation space, appropriate instruments, such as oxygen detectors and pressure indicators, should be installed to detect air ingress into the secondary insulation space. When air ingress is detected, appropriate measures should be adopted to prevent further air ingress and prevent the intruded air from forming a flammable mixture. For this purpose, inert gas circulation may be implemented with a shipboard inert gas generation system or shipboard inert gas storage. The inerting pressure should be managed to prevent further air ingress into the space. In that case, the amount of inert gas should be sufficient for consumption of at least 15 days.

RESOLUTION MSC.597(111) (adopted on 18 May 2026)
REVISED INTERIM RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CARRIAGE OF
LIQUEFIED HYDROGEN IN BULK